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ALICE IS NOT MISSING 
WONDERLAND. THE EASTWARD 
ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 
Miroslav Prokopijevic
* 
 
Summary 
In this paper I will try to show that the EU enlargement of 
2004 was not a good economic move for the eight newcomers from 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs). It is unlikely that the 
newcomers will get larger FDI, speed up their economic growth 
and catch up with richer EU countries, although this was broadly 
advertised both academically and by the EU “propaganda for 
happiness.” The EU subsidies, intended to offset accession costs, 
have turned out to be useless if not damaging for acceding 
economies, because they change the structure of incentives. So, 
instead of being rewarded for accession, accession countries are 
going to be punished twice. Firstly, by lower FDI and a persisting 
GDP gap. Secondly, by getting subsidies which worsen the 
                                                 
* Miroslav Prokopijevic, principal fellow of the Institute for European 
Studies, Belgrade, president of the Free Market Center, is professor of 
public choice at the Economics department, the University of 
Montenegro. E-mail address: mprokop@eunet.yu. This paper was first 
published on the website of the International Centre for Economic 
Research, ICER, at http://www.icer.it/menu/f_papers.html 
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situation. CEECs would be better off staying outside the EU and 
continuing to improve economic freedom and the rule of law. But 
even after having acceded, there is still some space for reasonable 
objectives of the CEECs, due to unintended consequences of the 
socialist enlargement design. 
  
 
Introduction 
After more than 10 years of transition from communism to 
constitutional market democracy, eight countries from Central and 
East Europe (CEECs) became members of the European Union 
(EU) on May 1, 2004.1 Even before the transition countries joined 
the Union, the main bulk of academic production in the field 
recommended integration by saying it was a good thing both for 
the Union and for these countries – in a political, economic or any 
other sense.2 One group of academic writers conceptualized full 
membership as a panacea for all CEEC problems – like Alice’s trip 
to Wonderland. This probably had to do with the prevailing 
mentality in the CEECs and the rational constructivism of the 
European official academia. The EU bodies contributed to such a 
picture with their own “propaganda for happiness”, which ignored 
or diminished problems and glorified the allegedly positive aspects 
of accession – a practice well known from the communist past. 
People with a strong interest cannot produce a balanced view. 
Intellectuals from acceding transition countries and the EU profit 
due to a higher demand for their services before, during and after 
accession. Eurocrats from Brussels profit from being paid well, for 
extending their rule to ten additional countries and running the 
game of EU25, which is less accountable than ever before. And 
some interest groups get subsidies.  
                                                 
1 By working on this study I have enjoyed the generous hospitality of 
the ICER. I would like to thank Enrico Colombatto (ICER & Turin 
university), Svetozar Pejovich (Professor emeritus at the Texas A & M 
University), Slavisa Tasic (Free market center), Simon Titel (Simon Titel 
and Associates) and several participants at the EACES 2004-conference 
for helpful comments. Usual caveat applies.  
2 “It is a commonly accepted view that further integration with the 
European structures will be beneficial to the CEECs in a political and 
economic sense.” Maliszewska 2004, p. 6.  
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The main finding of this paper is that for economically 
successful transition countries it would have been better to stay 
outside the EU, and to continue to improve the rule of law and 
economic freedom. This would have been the “first and best” 
choice for the CEECs. But even after some CEECs have joined the 
Union they need not be delivered at the mercy of the Eurocrats, 
since there is some scope within the Union for pursuing the above-
mentioned reasonable objectives, either due to the nature of 
integration or due to some unintended consequences of the “fifth 
enlargement” of 2004. Acceding to the EU and fighting from 
inside for more economic freedom emerges as “second best” 
choice. Inferior to “second best” is to accept heavy regulation and 
rent-seeking policies in exchange for subsidies and to join the over-
regulated economies of the EU15.  
 
In what follows, I will first consider the main economic 
reasons in favour of the CEECs joining the Union. 3 So, the 
advocates of the eastward enlargement pointed out that the CEE 
entrants would profit in economic terms for a number of reasons 
by:  
i) attracting more investment and especially FDI;4  
ii) increasing their growth rates and bridging the gap 
with the rest of the Union;5  
                                                 
3 “The enlargement of the European Union will have a positive impact 
on the economy of acceding countries. […] EU enlargement is expected 
to provide a significant further boost to economic growth and prosperity 
in acceding countries.” European Commission 2003, p. 5-6.  
This view strongly dominated the field and is supported by larger think-
tanks (Tinbergen institute, EUI, CESifo, WIIW, Jean Monet Center, ZEI, 
Robert Schuman Foundation, British CPS), the most frequently used 
textbooks on the EU (see books by D. Dinan, A. M. El-Agraa, Feldman & 
Watson, N. Nugent, Schneider & Aspinwall, D. Swann, W. & H. 
Wallace), by material at the university departments for European studies 
and by the most important non-market funds like IMF, WB, EBRD.  
4 “…it is obvious that integration does have a positive effect on trade 
and foreign direct investment (FDI) flows”. Kaitila 2004, p. 26. Breus 
(2000) estimated that, with full EU membership, FDI into CEECs could 
increase by up to 1.5 percentage points per year.  
5 “Full membership [of the CEECs] is expected to accelerate economic 
growth via increased foreign direct investment (FDI), new trade within  
the enlarged EU, and aid from the EU budget, and other channels.” 
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iii)  receiving subsidies in order to offset accession 
costs. 
None of that is true as we are going to show below (in the 
same order).  
 
 
1. Higher FDI  
Let us first consider the question of FDI. This will be divided 
into two steps. In step one I will consider what happens with FDI6 
for selected newcomers until shortly before accession, since the 
post-accession data are not available now. Step two draws an 
analogy with the flow of FDI in some EU15 countries that were 
similar (i.e., less developed than other EU countries) to transition 
countries when they acceded some decades ago.  
 
After the collapse of communism CEECs entered transition 
and started market reforms. Private investors reacted very 
positively to this change, especially where it was fast and 
profound. Since transition countries had not had enough 
accumulated capital they were required to import it. FDI is a fast 
way of transferring know-how, organisational and managerial 
practices and creating products for the world market, but above all 
it is a crucial indicator of a country’s integration into the global 
division of labour. In order to attract private FDI, countries needed 
to develop a good business environment, and how good they were 
at doing that is to be seen from the table below. As expected, FDI 
was generally on the rise in the CEECs throughout the 1990s, but it 
started to decline in 2002-2003. FDI peaked in CEECs in 2000 or 
2001, while Hungary had two peaks in 1993 and 2001.7 The peak 
                                                                                           
CESifo, 2004, p. 96. Wagner & Hloushova (2002) expect that even poorer 
members of EU25 will catch up in three or four decades. Lajour & oth. 
(2001) predict 9% and 5.8% rise of GDP for Hungary and Poland after 
accession, while Maliszewska (2004, p. 42) predicts a rise of GDP for two 
countries of 7% and 3.4% respectively. CESifo (2004, p. 99) cites even 
higher growth figures after accession that were stated by the EU 
Commission and some other studies.  
6 One has to bear in mind that a small fraction of FDI may stem from 
foreign governments and non-market funds like the WB and EBRD, while 
the majority of FDI is a private investment.  
7 FDI in Hungary was negative in 2003, since the data do not include 
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for CEECs as a group was in 2002.  
 
Table 1: FDI in 5 transition countries, 1989-2003,  
in million of dollars. 
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Source: EBRD, Transition report, 2002; Global development finance 2004 
(World Bank) for 2002 and 2003. Own calculation.  
                                                                                                    
reinvested profit. FDI does include inter-company loans.  
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By designing policies to attract FDI in the 1990s some 
countries used subsidies8 that were not legal according to EU law.9 
Even before accession, accession-candidates started to change their 
legislation in order to adjust it to the EU regulations.10 Some 
investors anticipated a loss of subsidies and decided to leave 
candidate countries or not to go there in the first place. For that 
reason Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia had 
lower FDI in 2003, compared to 2002. Total FDI in five countries 
fell from $ 19.8bn in 2002 to $ 8.4bn in 2003. Only in Estonia was 
FDI on the rise in 2003 compared with 2002. By putting aside the 
question of opacity in defining and using subsidies in the EU, it 
needs to be added that the provision of subsidies to firms is also a 
transfer from some government or non-market funds to firms 
partially to cover differential costs. It has turned out to be a transfer 
largely to foreign owners. All subsidies, including those to attract 
FDI, support activities that invoke considerable losses, some of 
them deadweight. It was a positive step of CEECs to remove part 
of their subsidies, even if this happened because of enforcement of 
EU law rather than on their own initiative. However, the fact that it 
is good to remove subsidies for FDI does not justify the 
expectation that FDI is going to rise due to accession. All those 
that accepted such a view acted on all other considerations rather 
than factual ones. In 2004 and thereafter FDI in the eight new 
members will be significantly lower than the peak in 2002.  
                                                 
8 A large majority of CEECs has used different subsidies (tax relief, 
financial assistance, property grants, provision of utilities, training, etc.) 
in order to attract more investment and especially FDI. For example, the 
Czech government approved in 1998 a package of incentives including 
corporate tax relief for 10 years (for newly established firms) or partial 
tax relief (for established companies), job creation grants, training grants, 
the provision of industrial property at low prices and infrastructure 
support.  
9 Beyond Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and structural funds, the 
EU in general does not allow so called direct subsidies, but it tolerates so 
called horizontal subsidies, i.e. those that benefit many (all) firms, and not 
just those that otherwise get some subsidy. It also allows subsidies for 
extremely underdeveloped regions (like ex-German Democratic 
Republic) or for depopulated regions, like northern parts of Sweden or 
Finland.  
10 For example, special Slovak incentives for foreign investors or 10-
year tax holidays were abolished in 2002.  
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The loss of subsidies was just one important factor for lower 
FDI in CEECs. Another may be the heavier regulation that was 
expected to be imposed on CEECs before and after accession. 
Some of the accession costs originating in regulation will be 
discussed later on. For now it suffices to say that the loss of 
subsidies and higher operation costs after accession were the main 
factors for more than halving FDI in CEECs in 2003 compared to 
2002.  
 
One may just partly accept my view and still say that FDI 
declined in the whole world after 2000, and that this trend explains 
the deterioration in FDI in newcomers more strongly than EU 
membership and the loss of subsidies do.  
 
Table 2: FDI in the world, in billion of dollars  
1990-
94 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
197.7 327.9 372.9 461.4 690.4 1076.6 1498.8 823 654 575 
 
Source: IMF 2003, p. 10. For years 1990-94 an average is counted; for years 
2001-03, see EIU 2004, p 9.  
 
  
FDI was halved in 2001 compared to 2000, but the same move 
cannot be observed in the CEECs. On the contrary, FDI rose in 
four out of five observed CEECs in 2001 compared to 2000, and 
fell in just one. The total FDI in five CEECs was significantly 
higher in 2002 than in 2001 – again contrary to the world trend. 
FDI started to decline in accession countries in 2003 – with the 
exception of Estonia – and this was precisely due to their 
anticipation of EU-membership and the removal of non-allowed 
subsidies. It therefore seems obvious that accession rather than a 
worldwide decline in FDI caused a decline in FDI in transition 
newcomers, and this contradicts what was stated both in academic 
publications and the political “propaganda for happiness”.  
 
Let us now go to the second step. As earlier cases of less 
developed new entrants to the EU, like Greece, Ireland, Portugal 
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and Spain, clearly show, FDI rose just temporarily due to the 
accession, and went back to the pre-accession level after some 8-10 
years, so that accession did not matter in the long run. In Greece 
FDI even halved when the country became an EU-member in 
1981. On the vertical axis in the next figure FDI is represented as a 
percentage of the GDP, while on the horizontal axis is represented 
the time of accession (t), with periods of 5 years prior (t-5) and 5 
and 10 years after accession (t+5, t+10).  
 
 
 
__Greece   __Spain   __Portugal   __Ireland 
 
 
Source: World economic outlook, IMF 2001, ch.4, p. 150. 
 
 
The above figure shows that FDI in Greece dropped, while 
that of Ireland, Portugal and Spain grew temporarily for some 8 
years between t and t+10, and thereafter went down to pre-
accession levels.11 However, in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain 
there was no deterioration in FDI prior to accession such as had 
happened in the transition newcomers mentioned earlier. Two 
factors explain this observation. The EU regulation was not as 
extensive (expensive) at the time when Ireland, Greece, Portugal 
and Spain acceded as it is now. Secondly, the EU policy toward the 
FDI-subsidies was not restrictive before, as it is now. Subsidies for 
                                                 
11 Although a temporary rise cannot prove the case for higher FDI, it 
represents a gain for the specific economy for as long as it lasts.  
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FDI were used broadly two or three decades ago by the EU-
members and in the 1990s they were outlawed due to the 
establishment of the common market.  
 
The conclusion from both steps above is straightforward. 
Advance in economic freedom and the rule of law is the main 
factor for attracting FDI rather than accession to the EU. The 
reason for this is very simple. Private investors are interested in a 
good business environment rather than in accession that brings 
about more regulation, costly adjustments and more power of 
bureaucracy over the economy.12  
 
Without larger changes in the design of economic institutions 
CEECs are unlikely to attract more FDI. A survey among 
international business people, conducted by The Economist 
Intelligence Unit, cooled off high expectations rela ted to FDI in 
CEECs. “The survey offers little support for the theory that EU 
enlargement will lead to a new surge of FDI inflows into the new 
entrants”.13 CEECs have already achieved the main benefits of 
integration for investment and “further positive changes to business 
environments associated with EU membership will be small”.14 
Stagnation in the size of FDI on a world level, and increasingly 
tough competition from Asia in particular, are the main external 
factors.  
 
                                                 
12 This is clear not just to pro-market economists but also to objective 
euro-optimists: “The preferential access to EU markets, coupled with the 
liberalization of Central and East European countries’ domestic markets, 
has promoted changes of specialization patterns in these countries. 
However, national options in terms of economic policy have constrained 
the rhythm and intensity of those changes. Those who adopted more 
radical liberalizing reforms, and applied wider programs of privatization 
and macroeconomic stabilization have attracted higher amounts of FDI 
and have progressed more in economic terms.” Caetano et alii, 2002, p. 5.  
13 EIU 2004, p. 14.  
14 EIU 2004, p. 13.  
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2. Bridging the GDP gap  
Considerations relating to what is going to happen with the 
GDP gap of acceding countries from CEE are also divided in two 
steps. Firstly, I will present the evidence related to GDP-
development in EU newcomers from CEE. Secondly, I will 
consider what happened with the GDP gap in Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain when these countries became the EU members.  
 
GDP fell sharply in transition countries during 1991-3, due to 
costly market reforms, and 1994 was the first year of GDP growth 
in a majority of the eight acceding transition countries. Post-reform 
recession in the Baltic countries lasted until 1993-4, since they 
entered transition later on. Taking into account the period 1994-
2003, the champions of growth are Latvia, Poland, Slovakia and 
Estonia, followed by Slovenia and Hungary, with Lithuania and the 
Czech Republic at the end.  
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Table 3: GDP growth in transition newcomers to the EU, 
in %. 
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Source: The World Bank files  (Internet) for years 1991-1994; IMF World 
economic outlook 2003. Statistical appendix, p. 183, for years 1995-2003. Note: 
1 = average; estimates for 2003; Own calculations.  
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The picture of transition champions is very different if we 
consider the number of years for which some countries had an 
above average growth rate in eight CEECs after 1994. In that case, 
Estonia and Latvia are at the top with 7 such years each, followed 
by Lithuania (6), Poland (5), Slovakia (4), Hungary (3), Slovenia 
(2) and the Czech Republic (1). Poland had good years throughout 
1995-1999, while all three Baltic countries grew faster than the 
CEE-8 group in 2001, 2002 and 2003. Slovakia is the only one of 
the remaining five countries, except for the Baltic states, that had 
grown above average in 2002 and 2003. This means that the Baltic 
states – as least those that are considered to be less developed 
among 8 CEE newcomers – bridged the gap faster than other 
transition countries and even the EU15.15  
 
The growth rate of the eight EU newcomers has been 
significantly higher than the growth rate of EU15 or the Eurozone 
from 1995 onwards. With the exception of Ireland, no other EU15-
country has grown faster than the eight CEE countries. This means 
that selected CEECs started to bridge the gap with the EU15 long 
before they became EU members. However, as can be seen from 
Table 3, growth rate in eight EU newcomers has been in decline 
from 2000 to the present – it was 4.65%, 4.19%, 4.11% and 3.76% 
in 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003 respectively. The eight newcomers 
were obliged to accept costly EU-regulation progressively, well 
ahead of accession, and this had a deteriorating effect on economic 
freedom, economic activity and consequently on GDP growth. 
Some tentative estimates stated that these costs of adjustment 
might increase to up to 10-12% of a country’s GDP. The topic, 
however, was never researched exhaustively and precisely, so that 
we will never find out what the real total cost of accession of the 
eight newcomers was. There are, however, some more or less 
complete estimates, and some of them are cited in this paper. 
Anyway, if transition newcomers continue to bridge the gap after 
accession, this is going to happen despite membership rather than 
because of membership.  
 
In order to find out what is going to happen to the GDP gap in 
                                                 
15 A country growing at 2% needs 35 years to double its GDP. Growth 
rate of 4% requires 17.5 years while growth rate of 7% requires 10.3 
years to double GDP.  
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transition countries after accession, let us consider what happened 
with the GDP gap in less developed countries that joined the Union 
a long time ago – like Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain.16 
 
Since its first enlargement in 1973, the EU bodies have stated 
that accession helps less developed countries to overcome 
backwardness, to narrow the gap and finally to catch up with more 
developed members. It seems that membership as such induces 
convergence in GDP and the standard of living. If this had 
happened before with less developed countries like Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain, this might be expected to happen to 
transition countries as well.17 Table 4 summarizes evidence related 
to the GDP gap. Spain and Portugal narrowed the gap moderately; 
Ireland did the same explosively, while only Greece stagnated.  
 
Table 4. Convergence in the EU15, selected countries and 
years, 
(GDP per capita , EU15=100) 
Country 1975 1985 1995 2001 
Greece 62 64 66 65 
Ireland 66 69 93 118 
Portugal 56 57 70 69 
Spain 82 74 78 84 
Source: Barysch 2003, p. 5, according to the OECD and Eurostat data.  
 
The level of the Greek GDP per capita compared to the EU 
average stagnated throughout the observed period, both before and 
after the country acceded to the Union. This happened despite the 
fact that Greece received significant subsidies from Brussels of 
between 2% and 5% of GDP per annum. When left-wing forces 
got rid of the dictatorship in the early 1970s, and when Greece 
became a democracy, the government designed policies to reward 
the main liberators’ interest groups, which required very high state 
expenditures, and redistribution policies that deteriorated growth 
                                                 
16 The investigation of the effects of trade creation and trade diversion 
is omitted, since it is related to the question whether actual EU -candidates 
were eventually close to the level of market protection or even above. 
See, Gross & Gonciarz 1996.  
17 Ireland has acceded in 1973, together with UK and Denmark, Greece 
joined in 1981, while Portugal and Spain joined in 1986.  
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and allowed only modest growth rates. By entering the EU Greece 
even worsened its economic policies – in exchange for costly 
adjustments in regulation Greece got subsidies from the EU. As a 
result, the country’s distance in terms of GDP pc remained the 
same both before and after accession.18  
 
Ireland has gone through two phases while being in the EU. 
First, it stagnated for more than a decade, again despite accession 
and a large volume of EU subsidies. Second, Ireland prospered 
after the mid-1980s and soon surpassed the EU average income. 
This happened due to a huge improvement in economic freedom 
rather than accession. As a result, after larger economic reforms 
were conducted in Ireland from the mid-1980s on, Ireland’s GDP 
increased at an average rate of 5.14% from 1990 to 1995, and it 
increased at an average rate of 9.66% from 1996 to 2000. 
Empirical evidence clearly suggests that subsidies from Brussels 
have not been the major cause of Ireland’s economic success.19  
 
To sum up, all four considered cases show that membership in 
the EU per se does not mean solid growth rates and “catch up” 
policies. Growth rates result from liberalisation policies rather than 
from the EU membership. The regulation required by membership 
makes business transactions more costly and deteriorates growth. 
Without larger advances in economic freedom countries remain 
stagnant despite EU membership. Subsidies from Brussels cannot 
induce sustainable growth, if any. Governments benefit more from 
granting subsidies to their political supporters than by directing 
them to the most profitable projects. We are going to see later on 
that subsidies have a negative impact on a subsidised economy 
because they change the structure of incentives and retard growth. 
For now we may conclude that the expected large rise of GDP after 
accession was a myth in the past and that it is not likely to be very 
different with CEECs in the near future. Membership alone and 
subsidies from Brussels cannot help the eight transition countries 
in developing “catch-up” policies. If they have such an objective, 
                                                 
18 Ironically, the fastest tempo of development Greece experienced after 
WW II was under the dictatorship of 1954-1974, with an average growth 
rate of 7%, when it conducted sound economic policies. Cf. Prokopijevic 
2002, p. 17-18.  
19 Cf. Powell 2003, p. 431.  
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they need to introduce policies to improve economic freedom and 
the rule of law. EU membership is not an obstacle for such policies 
per se, as the cases of more liberal EU members show, like the UK, 
Ireland or Luxembourg. Provided governments are committed to 
reform and ready to pay for its cost, advances in economic freedom 
and the rule of law are possible. It is questionable, however, 
whether governments may resist rent-seeking policies strengthened 
by a flow of Brussels’ subsidies that change the structure of 
incentives.  
 
 
3. Subsidies to offset accession costs  
In contrast to apparent disadvantages for transition newcomers 
resulting from the accession, which are kept far away from 
publicity, transfers from the EU to newcomers are highly 
publicised. They are the basic element of the “propaganda for 
happiness” that is systematically conducted from Brussels. Let us 
for now accept official EU propaganda that subsidies are useful. 
Transfers are limited to 4% of countries’ GDP, and it is said that 
newcomers will profit more from the EU single market. However, 
newcomers profited from the common market long before they 
acceded, after they had contracted “Europe agreements” in the 
1990s, which allowed free trade between them and EU15.  
 
What is worrying about the subsidy of up to 4% of GDP, is 
that it is highly unlikely that the newcomers will get it, since the 
CEE countries by entering the EU will contribute 1.20% of their 
GDP to the EU budget, which reduces the net subsidy from 4% to 
2.80% of their respective GDP. It is also questionable what 
proportion of the 2.80% subsidy the new entrants will get, 
especially in the first years after accession, since their “absorption 
capacity” is low, according to the EU bodies, due to poorly 
prepared institutions for that operation. But even if newcomers get 
subsidies of up to 2.80%, this is bad news for their economies due 
to a number of adverse effects.  
 
By entering the EU, firms from the newcomers undergo quotas 
intended to reduce the production of some goods and services, 
which causes a net loss to the newcomers’ economies. Quotas do 
restrain firms in some areas (agriculture, textile, steel, fishery) 
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from entering the EU market, and these restrictions are negotiated 
before accession. For example, Poland and the Czech Republic are 
to reduce steel production for 1.2 m/t and 0.6 m/t respectively in 
the period 1996-2007.20 Similar restrictions hold for other 
members. The EU Commission will monitor the implementation of 
reduction. Actually, wherever subsidies exist, overproduction is 
encouraged, and restraints like quotas are needed. During 
negotiations, Slovakia asked to produce 1.2bn litres of subsidised 
milk, but the EU set the limit at 950m litres per year. Slovakia 
wished to raise 400,000 sheep, but the EU set the limit at 218,000. 
According to the Hungarian political party Fidesz, Hungarian 
agriculture alone may lose up to $ 6bn over the next ten years due 
to trade restraints.21 Accession related trade restrictions will have 
especially bad effects on the economically most liberal transition 
country. “Estonia will have to erect a vast wall of common external 
tariffs against non-EU countries, starting this year [2000], jumping 
from last year’s baseline of zero to a total of 10,794 different 
tariffs. This will result in serious distortions, and will particularly 
increase the cost of food. […] [Also,] upon accession Estonia will 
have to introduce a panoply of EU non-tariff barriers (e.g., 
subsidies, quotas, and antidumping duties) that will divert imports 
from low cost locations outside the EU to high cost locations 
within it. In particular, imports of coal and steel will become more 
expensive.”22 Before starting accession adjustment, Estonia had a 
0% customs rate and no non-tariff barriers. In addition, and 
contrary to other CEECs facing an annual financial burden of 2-3% 
for meeting environmental regulations, Estonia’s environmental 
costs are estimated to be of the order of 4 to 5 percent of GDP.23  
 
Probably the most damaging effect of accession consists in 
imposing very tight regulation on incoming economies, which is 
unnecessary and is merely intended to offset their comparative 
advantage, basically consisting of a cheaper labour force, less 
regulation, and lower taxes. The most costly are the regulations 
                                                 
20 Cf. Perlitz 2003, p. 13, 14. Poland will have to reduce the numb er of 
employees in the steel sector from 23,000 to 16,000 from 1996 to 2007. 
Ibid, p. 13-14.  
21 Cf. Tupy 2003, p. 11.  
22 Razeen Sally, cited according Tupy 2003, p. 15.  
23 Cf. CESifo 2004, p. 103.  
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related to the labour market, environmental protection, consumer 
protection, and administrative and judicial standards. For example, 
environmental regulations will have imposed a cost of up to € 
120bn on the eight CEECs by 2015. This means that CEECs will 
have to cover environmental expenditures of around € 10bn per 
year, which again is equal to the annual net transfers from the 
EU15 to the newcomers. The cost of confronting Poland with the 
EU environmental standards alone is estimated at € 40bn over the 
transitional period that ends in 2015. 24 It is an amount equal to the 
whole Polish budget. The EU Commission estimates25 that costs of 
the environmental regulation alone will consume between 2% and 
3% of the CEECs’ annual GDP during the 7 year transition period. 
 
Eventual application of the European regulations to the 
newcomers’ labour markets will cause a larger jump in labour 
costs, which is going to affect adversely the demand for labour. 
Firms are going to be affected by costly regulations and in 
combination with higher labour and environmental costs this will 
raise both start-up and operational costs and impair the countries’ 
competitiveness. Less demand for labour will lead to larger 
unemployment; higher start-up and labour costs will lead to fewer 
new firms than would otherwise have been the case; and lower 
business formation will inhibit the economy, slow down growth 
rates, and degenerate the business environment. Lower 
competitiveness will reduce market return and continue to have a 
negative dynamic impact on the economy. 26 This clearly 
contradicts bridge-the-gap-policies.  
 
Bureaucrats from the EU15 worry about a flood of workers 
from the newcomers. The best way to keep workers at home is to 
                                                 
24 Cf. Walsh, 39.  
25 Environment, EU Commission, at the site: http://europa.eu.int/ 
comm/enlargement/negotiations/chapters/chap22/index.html   
26 In addition, transition newcomers will be subject to economic 
policies over which they have no influence. For example, the CAP 
(Common Agricultural Policy) was defined for the period 2006-2013, 
before the new entrants had arrived. It is unlikely that the CAP is going to 
be essentially changed from what it is now, although it is well known for 
being ecologically harmful, economically inefficient and legally unjust, 
since it favours the largest farms.  
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allow them to get a good job in their home country. However, 
costly regulation that is going to be imposed on the newcomers 
will not just reduce the number of jobs available; by slowing down 
economic growth it will also keep workers from the newcomers 
relatively poor for longer than necessary, and thus increase worker 
flight to higher-wage countries. As it is well known, doors to 
higher-wage countries for workers from newcomers will be closed 
for 7 years, so that newcomers will have to bear the cost of higher 
unemployment.27 Ex East Germany provides a very good example 
of what happens when a country gets high salaries and unnecessary 
but costly labour and other regulation. In 2004, despite a transfer of 
€ 1.2 trillion from West Germany following reunification of the 
country, the unemployment rate in the Eastern part was more than 
twice as high as it was in the Western part. Something similar 
awaits the CEE newcomers if they accept business regulation at the 
French-German level.  
 
In exchange for losing comparative advantages through 
regulation and quotas, the newcomers will get subsidies of up to 
2.80% of GDP, which are unlikely to offset their losses, and which 
are going to change their economic environment over time, by 
providing incentives for more subsidies28, regulation, rent seeking 
and arbitration over economy. This will result in lower 
competitiveness and productivity, and in a decline of risk-taking 
and innovation, the driving forces of modern economies. If a firm 
can earn more income from Brussels than from the market, it will 
invest less in becoming more efficient (competitive) and it will 
prefer to invest in lobbying and bribing bureaucrats controlling and 
distributing EU money.  
                                                 
27 Unemployment rates in CEECs were on average during the period 
2002-2004 between 5.8% in Slovenia and Hungary, and 16.5% and 20% 
in Slovakia and Poland respectively. Cf. CESifo 2004, p. 104. 
Unemployment figures are likely to rise in CEECs, not just because of 
more expensive regulation. The agricultural sector in CEECs employs 7-
25% of the total working force. Since this sector will shrink to the 3-5% 
EU-level in the next years, surplus labour will join those who are already 
unemployed.  
28 Incentives undergo changes for all actors in a society – citizens, 
politicians, bureaucrats, firms, NGO, non-market funds, national and 
international organisations, interest groups, business associations, unions.  
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Both managers (owners) and bureaucrats will be engaged in 
non-productive activity. Subsidies from Brussels will decrease 
incentives of the government to conduct reforms. National and 
international bureaucrats will spend other peoples’ money and both 
are well known for being ignorant as to where to invest.29 
Otherwise, they would be rich by being successful entrepreneurs 
and would not be bureaucrats at all.  
 
The use of subsidies requires regulation (tariff, non-tariff 
barriers, export subsidy, protective price, etc.), which suspends 
market forces by implementing restrictions, prohibitions, non-
necessary procedures, bureaucratic arbitration, government 
policies. This hinders whole sectors from developing and raises the 
cost of business operation.30 It requires a larger increase of 
bureaucrats on all levels – from municipality to Brussels. An 
enlarged echelon of clerks will require further enlargement in 
monitoring, auditing, anti-fraud and similar agencies. Instead of 
doing something productive, all these people will live at the 
expense of taxpayers. Due to the “democratic deficit”, the 
bureaucratic echelon will develop into an uncontrollable money 
extracting machine. But instead of being controlled, Eurocrats plan 
to hire 5,161 new bureaucrats in the CEE to monitor the 
newcomers’ compliance with the acquis. Instead of being 
controlled more vigorously, bureaucrats will extend their own 
control over the economy and the electorate.  
 
Predictably, corruption prospers in such an environment. The 
larger role of bureaucrats in economic life goes hand in hand with 
corruption opportunities. “A senior partner at Ernst and Young 
calculated that around five per cent of the Commission’s budget – 
or almost £ 4 billion – goes missing every year, but even this may 
well underestimate the scale of the problem”.31 Having this in 
                                                 
29 Cf. Stanchev et alii, 2004.  
30 Firms and whole sectors can misinvest in order to capture subsidies 
and this misallocation will be covered by taxpayers. The harm is doubled; 
first there is misallocation, and secondly, there is the prize (subsidy) for 
that. Employees will be engaged in lobbying, strikes, threat of strikes, 
cheating and bribes instead of in productive efforts leading to innovation, 
efficiency and growth.  
31 Cf. Blundell & Frost, 2004, p. 27.  
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mind, anti-corruption policies and measures should be well 
designed and tight. However, this is not the case. Cases of 
corruption involving EU bodies are unlikely to be investigated, 
publicised and prosecuted, since the investigation is impossible 
without the authorities in member states, and member states are 
short of incentives to conduct such an investigation. If they 
discover corruption and find offenders, they have to compensate 
damage to the EU funds and to punish the perpetrators. By doing 
so, member states will cause losses and trouble to themselves. 
First, by imposing fines over themselves, their budget will face a 
financial loss. Secondly, it is not easy to punish influential 
bureaucrats and at the same time avoid political clashes and unrest 
in the bureaucratic echelon. Thirdly, by fighting corruption, some 
interest groups will face losses and will not accept that without 
counteraction. Bearing all this in mind it is clear why Eurocracy 
keeps a low profile on corruption, and why some occurrences come 
to light only when things go too far, as happened in March 1999 
with the resignation of Santer’s Commission. 32  
 
As was already pointed out, subsidies are highly publicised, 
while the costs of subsidies and negotiations on imposing trade 
restrictions and regulations are not. The truth is that subsidies from 
Brussels are just a fraction of what the newcomers will lose due to 
regulation and quotas. Although total transfers from the EU15 to 
the ten newcomers exceed € 40bn for years 2004-2006, the net 
transfer per year over the same period is likely to be € 10-12bn.33 
As we have seen, environmental costs alone offset the amount of 
net transfers – not to mention other costs. But even if subsidies 
were larger, this would not offset the losses, since this money 
would flow from bureaucrats rather than from markets, making 
economies even more dependent on bureaucrats than on markets in 
the next round, and changing the structure of incentives in the 
economy. Bureaucrats spend money according to political 
objectives rather than according to economic efficiency, which 
again encourages corruption, stealing, unfair auctions and other 
forms of funds’ misuse.  
                                                 
32 According to the official explanation, the Commission had lost 
control over EU funds. The investigation found more than € 3bn 
“misused” money.  
33 Cf. Walsh, 31.  
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All this playing with subsidies – unfriendly to market forces – 
might be tolerated provided there was some point in it. However, 
this is not the case. Greece has championed in subsidies from 
Brussels in per capita  terms during the past two decades, but 
despite this it has remained the poorest EU15 country. Ireland, its 
poor companion some two decades ago, contrary to Greece, has 
relied on market reforms rather than on subsidies. As a result, 
Ireland is today the second richest country in the EU25, just behind 
Luxembourg. When the EU started disbursing aid through 
structural and cohesion funds, 44% of the EU population lived in 
regions that qualified for it. By 1997 that percentage increased to 
nearly 52%, which shows that the program not only failed to 
promote growth but spread stagnation and decline even beyond 
targeted regions.34 Subsidies may be beneficial for politicians and 
users, but they are economically inefficient, damaging, or both. If 
so, CEECs are going to be punished twice for accession: first, by 
obtaining quotas and expensive regulation; secondly , by receiving 
subsidies which will worsen the situation.  
 
 
4. Unintended consequences 
The enlargement from 2004 onwards was designed similarly 
to previous ones, in a manner of social engineering: in order to 
provide a new market for the EU15 and to prevent costly changes 
in expensive EU15 regulation, new entrants will be allowed to join 
in exchange for accepting the existing rules of the game. This 
means that new members have to accept costly regulation, which 
reduces their competitiveness, and in exchange they will get 
subsidies to offset their adjustment costs. The amount of subsidies 
for the EU new members of 2004 was not generous compared to 
those made during previous enlargements when compensation 
moved around the level of 2-5% of the GDP of new members. New 
members were also promised that they would get larger FDI, 
speeded up growth rates, and would bridge the gap with the rest of 
the Union. Since this is unlikely to happen as we have seen in 
previous enlargements, it may be that for the economically most 
successful transition countries – those having well designed 
                                                 
34 Cf. Tupy 2003, p. 17-18.  
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economic rules – it would be better to stay outside the Union.35 
Instead of entering the EU and a nightmare of bureaucratic supra-
national regulation and arbitration over the economy, it would be 
better to stay outside and continue to improve economic freedom 
and the rule of law – i.e. all those things that contribute to 
individual freedom and welfare.  
 
Conditions for this already existed, since Estonia 36 was already 
more free in an economic sense than nearly any of the EU15 
countries, while Latvia, Lithuania and the Czech Republic were on 
average equally free as the EU15 average country (see Table 5). 
These countries have improved economic freedom more in 12 
years than the average EU country had for decades. Even some rare 
authors, whose works are to be found on the EU-official web site, 
now recognize this. “In some cases, the accession states 
demonstrate a greater adherence to liberal economies than 
established EU members.”37 Had the CEECs opted out of the EU, 
the neighbourhood of reform-fatigued, over-regulated and passive 
giants, like the EU, would even have facilitated and speeded up the 
economic success of the economically open CEECs. This strategy 
might have induced Brussels’ bureaucracy to reconsider its policy 
and to shift to diversity, liberalisation and competition. If the 
Wonderland had then changed in a positive way, Alice might have 
considered joining one day, if that was going to be profitable for 
her. The “first best” option – to stay outside the EU and improve 
economic freedom and the rule of law – has however been 
abandoned through accession for at least a period of time. The 
“second best” option – to fight for economic freedom and the rule 
of law inside the Union – is still available, but in no way 
guaranteed.  
 
                                                 
35 “… for the EU and for the new member states, enlargement is a poor 
deal”. Walsh 2003, p. 7. Tupy (2003) agrees with this conclusion.  
36 Estonia is ranked just after Luxembourg and Ireland according to the 
Heritage foundation in 2004, and after UK, Ireland and Luxembourg 
according to the ranking by the Fraser institute in 2002. See Table 5 in the 
text.  
37 Walsh, 40.  
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Table 5: Economic freedom in the EU25 in 2001, 2002 and 
2004 
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4 Luxemb. 8.23 5 UK 8.2 8.2 1 UK 8.11 
5 Ireland 8.14 8 Ireland 8.0 7.8 2 Luxemb. 8.01 
6 Estonia 8.10 10 Holland 7.8 7.7 3 Ireland 7.98 
7 UK 8.02 11 Finland 7.7 7.7 4 Denmark 7.80 
8 Denmark 8.00 12 Luxemb. 7.7 7.8 5 Estonia 7.80 
12 Sweden 7.75 13 Austria 7.6 7.5 6 Finland 7.66 
14 Cyprus 7.62 14 Denmark 7.6 7.6 7 Holland 7.55 
15 Finland 7.62 16 Estonia 7.5 7.7 8 Sweden 7.52 
18 Germany 7.43 18 Belgium 7.4 7.4 9 Austria 7.40 
19 Holland 7.40 21 Germany 7.3 7.3 10 Germany 7.36 
20 Austria 7.30 25 Portugal 7.2 7.2 11 Belgium 7.21 
22 Belgium 7.02 32 Sweden 7.1 7.3 12 Cyprus 7.11 
23 Lithuania 7.02 35 Hungary 7.0 7.3 13 Italy 6.95 
26 Italy 6.90 36 Italy 7.0 7.0 14 Lithuania 6.91 
27 Spain 6.73 38 Spain 7.0 7.1 15 Spain 6.91 
30 Latvia 6.60 39 Czech R. 6.9 6.9 16 Portugal 6.86 
31 Portugal 6.52 44 France 6.7 6.8 17 Latvia 6.80 
32 Czech R. 6.52 45 Greece 6.7 6.9 18 Czech R. 6.71 
35 Slovak R. 6.39 54 Latvia 6.6 7.0 19 Hungary 6.65 
37 Malta 6.22 61 Malta 6.4 6.8 20 Malta 6.51 
42 Hungary 6.00 69 Cyprus 6.2 6.6 21 Slovak R. 6.46 
45 France 5.93 70 Lithuania 6.2 6.8 22 France 6.36 
52 Slovenia 5.62 76 Slovenia 6.1 6.2 23 Greece 6.20 
54 Greece 5.50 79 Poland 6.0 6.4 24 Poland 5.91 
57 Poland 5.47 80 Slovak rep. 6.0 6.6 25 Slovenia 5.91 
 Average  6.96  Average  7.04 7.18  Average  7.07 
Source: The 2004 index of economic freedom, ch. Executive summary , p. 
9-10; Gwartney, J. (Ed) (2003), p. 13-15.  
 
Note: 1= Index of the Heritage foundation for 2004 (HF), recounted 
on the scale 0-10; 2 = Index of the Fraser institute on the scale 0-10 (FI); 
in both ratings 0 means no economic freedom while 10 means maximum 
of economic freedom; 3 = Ranking of the EU25-countries is based on the 
arithmetic mean of HF and FI indexes. 
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What is going to happen to the economic freedom and GDP of 
the eight EU-newcomers from the CEE in forthcoming years 
basically depends on how they are going to behave after accession. 
Countries that will rely on heavy regulation, rent-seeking and the 
heavy hand of the state will become similar to the less liberal EU15 
members,38 and as a result, they will face stagnation both in 
investment and GDP rates. They will even miss the “second best” 
option.  
 
Although accession was not the best choice for “success 
stories” among CEECs, it is not the end of the world now that they 
have mistakenly acceded. Their posit ion now is weaker, but the 
adherents of individual freedom in these countries do not need to 
be altogether desperate. The EU25 is rather more a diverse than a 
homogeneous unit, and the EU15 will undergo a larger shock 
caused by the accession of the ten new countries. 
  
The diversity of the EU is going to be greater after accession 
of the ten countries than before. There are situations where nearly 
all newcomers adhere to quite different rules compared to the 
EU15. For example, all eight CEECs have lower corporate tax 
rates than the EU – on average 10%, and lower top rates for 
income tax of 11%.39 The total tax burden – taxes plus social 
contributions – in the EU25 is highest in Sweden (50.6% of GDP), 
Denmark (48.9%) and Belgium (46.6%) and the lowest in Ireland 
(28.6%), Latvia (28.8%) and Lithuania (31.3%). The former group 
has an average rate of 48.7%, the later one of 29.6% while the 
CEECs average is 35.2%.40 Considering such larger differences, it 
is important to monitor what is going to happen after accession. 
Are high-tax EU nations going to suppress low-tax members, say, 
by enforcing tax harmonisation41 at the higher tax rates? This has 
                                                 
38 The four economically most illiberal EU15-countries, according to 
the Heritage foundation index in 2004 are Greece (ranked 54th with index 
5.50), France (45th, 5.93), Portugal (31st, 6.52) and Spain (27th, 6.73). The 
same four are the most illiberal according to the HF/FI average.  
39 Cf. European Commission 2004, p. 8. The VAT rates in the EU15 ran 
between 15% and 25%, while the CEECs’ average is 19%.  
40 Cf. European Commission 2004, p. 239. Own calculation.  
41 A first attempt to harmonize direct taxes in EU25 failed in September 
2004. It has been proposed by the ECOFIN and backed up by the EU 
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not happened in the EU15. For example, the tax burden in Sweden 
was larger by 22% than that in Ireland, and there have been no 
large indications of tax competition. But this may happen if high 
tax nations offer subsidies to low tax nations in exchange for their 
acceptance of higher tax rates. In order for this to happen, all EU15 
members would have to accept this higher expenditure; although 
this is unlikely for now, it can not be excluded in principle. If high 
tax nations for any reason succeed in imposing high taxes over low 
tax nations, they themselves may postpone necessary changes in 
their over-regulated and expensive economic systems. In this case 
the EU25 will resemble an even more rigid, centrally harmonised 
“nirvana” that misses incentives for change, innovation and 
competition among jurisdictions.42 
 
If high tax nations do not succeed in imposing heavy 
regulation on the newcomers, they will be forced to change their 
own tax systems with high rates and excessive regulation, which is 
politically extremely costly, and for that reason, the high-tax 
nations will do everything before falling back on this option.  
 
It seems obvious that the EU after its “historical enlargement” 
is going to be much more diverse than ever before. This means, 
that this enlargement may have some unintended consequences. 
Instead of being a large homogenous and harmonised bloc, the EU 
may become divided into groups of comparatively diverse 
countries, which tend to move at two or more different speeds. 
Continued political integration and harmonization may appear to 
be impossible tasks in the light of greater diversity among country 
members. Instead of leading to a stronger and politically more 
integrated Union, the fifth enlargement may provoke a halt or even 
a set back to integration as conducted up to now. Enlarged 
diversity might lead to stalled political integration and a division of 
countries into several clubs rather than to a further push towards 
unification and closer political integration. But this is good news. 
By siding with more liberal “old members” of the Union, liberal 
newcomers may be a decisive factor in preventing a dangerous 
political integration and over-regulation and so inspire a comeback 
                                                                                                    
Commission.  
42 Cf. Colombatto, 2000.  
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to the liberal economic dimension of the Union. It is surprising that 
a dirigiste, socialist design, due to unintended consequences, may 
lead to a liberal outcome, but this is not unlikely to happen. In 
behaving this way liberal newcomers will face some “aggravated 
circumstances”. One would be their weaker internal position, due 
to a changed structure of incentives in their internal policies and 
economies. The other may be pressure from the EU institutions and 
some larger countries from the Union, who may share other plans 
and objectives. Nevertheless, Alice’s battle is not lost either way.  
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LOCKING IN HIGH TAX RATES 
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EU taxing powers – the claims 
 
“The Government believes that the right of 
Member States to determine their own tax policies 
is a fundamental one. Tax matters are a key 
component of national sovereignty and vital to the 
social and economic wellbeing of the country.” 
UK Government, September 20031 
“issues like tax, defence and foreign policy 
remain the province of the nation State” 
Tony Blair, September 20032 
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2 Foreword to “A Constitutional Treaty for the EU”, Foreign & 
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“The Government will continue to reject tax 
harmonisation and favour fair tax competition, 
recognising that in a global economy such 
harmonisation would impede economic growth, 
and not promote it.” 
UK Government, April 20043 
 
The reality – EU-imposed taxes 
Taxes are already harmonised and imposed at the EU level. 
The Commission’s current tax harmonising activities are in general 
business taxation and the taxation of indiv iduals’ savings, but the 
process began many years ago with indirect taxes, particularly 
VAT where the tax system is controlled by the EU. It is 
compulsory for all EU Member States to adopt VAT, in the form 
and under the rules prescribed4, and charge it on all sales except 
those that the EU permits to be exempt. 
Two arguments are used to claim that this does not amount to 
an EU-imposed tax, or remove the national parliaments’ power 
over tax. The first is that although the system of VAT is imposed 
by the EU, the rates are not, and so the decision to charge tax, and 
how much, is therefore still the prerogative of national parliaments. 
The second argument is that EU decisions on tax still require 
unanimity, and therefore an EU decision to tax is in fact a decision 
by each national government. Indeed the UK government, in its 
commentary on the constitutional treaty negotiations, cited this 
requirement for unanimity as proof that it has successfully resisted 
tax harmonisation: 
                                                                                                    
 
Commonwealth Office White Paper, Cm5934, September 2003. 
3 “Prospects for the EU in 2004”, para 36, Foreign & Commonwealth 
Office White Paper, Cm6174, April 2004. 
4 Currently the “6th Directive on the harmonisation of the laws of 
member states relating to turnover taxes”, Dir 77/388. 
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“The Government committed itself in the September 2003 
White Paper (paragraph 76) to ensure that tax matters would 
continue to be decided by unanimity, in line with its manifesto 
commitment. This commitment has been delivered upon. The 
Convention’s proposals that certain aspects of indirect and 
company taxation could be adopted by qualified majority voting 
have been deleted.”5 
These arguments are not valid; the first is untrue, and the 
second is insufficient to ensure national democratic control. 
Firstly, tax rates have been imposed at the EU level; the 6th 
Directive on VAT sets minimum VAT rates of 15% as a standard 
rate and 5% as a reduced rate6 for favoured products.7 It is 
therefore unlawful for an EU Member State to reduce its VAT 
levels below this point, and so tax would be imposed by the EU 
against the wishes of a national government.8 
This is not just a theoretical provision; it has already inflicted 
tax on UK taxpayers. In 1997 the UK Parliament voted to charge 
VAT at the full rate on domestic fuel and power9 (it had previously 
enjoyed a preferential 0% rate10). Later in the same year it desired 
                                                 
 
5 Foreign & Commonwealth Office, “White Paper on the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe”, Cm6309, September 2004. 
6 6th Directive on the harmonisation of the laws of member states 
relating to turnover taxes”, Dir 77/388, paragraph 12(3). 
7 In addition, the products favoured by being taxed at reduced rates 
must come from approved categories listed in Annex H of the Directive. 
8 Admittedly these provisions are currently temporary, being imposed 
for 5 years at a time. 
9 Finance Act 1997. 
10 This ‘zero-rating’ is partly a mechanism by which the UK 
government avoided the EU prohibition on exempting any products and 
services from VAT other than those on an approved list; technically VAT 
is charged, but at the rate of 0%. It is also more beneficial than 
exemption, in that businesses making supplies of zero-rated products are 
able to reclaim VAT paid on their costs, so removing all VAT from the 
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to restore the 0% rate, but was unable to do so because although 
the EU Directive permits historic lower rates of VAT to remain as 
a ‘transitional’ measure, it forbids any new products to be added to 
the list or for products to return to a lower rate once their rate has 
(however temporarily) been increased. VAT is therefore charged 
on domestic fuel at 5% in the UK; the lowest rate permitted under 
the EU Directive.11 
Taxes are therefore imposed by the EU. Of course this 
minimum tax initially had to be unanimously agreed by the 
governments of the Member States, which is the politicians’ 
second defence against the claims of EU taxing rights. However 
this defence is only valid immediately, not temporally; the initial 
adoption of a tax rate needs to be unanimous, and so may not 
involve a transfer of taxing rights from national governments to the 
EU, but once that agreement has been reached national parliaments 
are unable to change their tax rates unilaterally. The citizens of a 
Member State are therefore unable to reduce their tax rates below 
the level prescribed by the EU, even if they elect a new 
government for that precise purpose. 
Effectively this allows governments to bind in their successors 
to high tax rates, by agreeing to an EU minimum tax that cannot 
then be lowered without unanimous agreement across all Member 
States. This flouts the basic democratic principle that future 
governments cannot be bound (except by a constitutional 
provision, which usua lly requires a super-majority or referendum), 
and grants powers to present governments that should rightly 
belong to future electorates.12 
The EU has therefore, at least in part, gained the ability to 
impose taxes; Member State citizens are unable to vote for a 
                                                                                                    
 
supply chain. 
11 Finance (No. 2) Act 1997, s6. 
12 There is a further constitutional problem, namely that EU decisions 
are generally made by government ministers, whereas taxes generally 
have to be set by parliaments. 
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government that can reduce their VAT levels below the EU 
minimum. If they did so then legal action would be taken against 
that country’s government through the European Court of Justice, 
either by the Commission itself or by businesses from other states 
who were made less competitive by the ‘unlawful’ tax reduction. 
 
 
The Savings Tax Directive 
The EU also has new powers to impose taxes on investments 
as well as spending, through the Savings Tax Directive. This is the 
widely reported process by which the EU governments are hoping 
to stop their citizens from sheltering their savings in low-tax 
countries, to enable future tax rises without causing capital flight. 
Although defeated many times, the Directive was finally 
passed on 24th June 2005,13 and came into force on 1st July 2005. 
Under this Directive all interest payments to EU residents will be 
subject to a minimum tax of 15% for the first 3 years of operation 
of the system, then 20% (the international norm for tax deductions 
from bank interest) for the next 3 years, rising to a clearly punitive 
35% thereafter.14 
Alternatively Member States can opt for a system of 
‘automatic reporting’, where the bank has to notify the amount of 
interest paid to the recipient’s national tax authority so that they 
can tax it themselves. This would make it easy for the investor’s 
home authority to impose tax, but would run against the tradition in 
many countries of protecting investors through client 
confidentiality and banking secrecy.15 
                                                 
 
13 Council (ECOFIN) decision, document 10038/05 FISC 69. 
14 The proceeds of this tax will be split, with 75% going to the Member 
State where the investor is resident and the remaining 25% retained by the 
country where the interest is paid. 
15 Reporting also acts as tax harmonisation ‘by the back door’, as it 
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The European Commission has been pushing for such a 
scheme for15 years, but the process was held up primarily by two 
members of the EU that effectively act as on-shore tax havens. 
The first, Luxembourg, has for its size a massive financial 
services sector, fuelled by its tax exemptions for interest payments 
and strong banking secrecy; it is therefore unwilling to agree to 
anything that would risk losing any of this business. Indeed it was 
the loss of tax revenue to the German government through its 
citizens putting their money into Luxembourg banks (a process 
made easier by the removal of border controls in the EU, and by 
the introduction of the Euro) that arguably started this whole 
process. Austria also has banking secrecy and is involved to a 
lesser extent in the same sort of financial business as Luxembourg.  
However the other major EU tax haven is the UK, whose 
massive $3 trillion Eurobond market is tax-free. Multinational 
groups can issue bonds, traded on the London Stock Exchange, and 
pay interest without any requirement to deduct withhold ing tax. 
This allows companies (mainly but not exclusively US and 
Japanese) to borrow money more cheaply by paying interest to 
investors gross, and hence again promotes productive investment 
and so generates employment and wealth. The existence of this 
market in London brings much wealth to the UK, particularly 
highly paid financial sector jobs, associated legal and accountancy 
work and rents and taxes paid by banks and traders. 
 
 
The Savings Directive and the wider world 
For both of these countries therefore, the Savings Tax 
Directive would damage their national economies; both the 
Luxembourg bank deposits and the London Eurobond market are 
attractive primarily because they are tax-free. It is true that both 
                                                                                                    
 
makes it impossible for many taxpayers to take advantage of lower tax 
rates on offer in other EU states. 
Richard Teather 
39 
countries also have reasonably efficient banking and dealing 
sectors, but no more than many other jurisdictions; if tax had to be 
imposed because of the EU then there would be no particular 
reason for this activity to stay in either country. 
This relocation risk was one of the strongest arguments used 
by the UK and Luxembourg. Bank deposits are clearly mobile, and 
although the Eurobond market seems more permanent it has moved 
once already (from New York) because of tax and would 
presumably be ready to move again. The Savings Tax Directive 
would therefore do only harm, not good, since if all savings within 
the EU were taxed then investors would simply move their money 
outside. The EU would therefore lose valuable financial sector 
business and the related income (and employment), but without 
collecting significantly more tax. 
Indeed there is evidence that capital flight has begun; the 
Hong Kong Securities & Futures Commission reported that 
investments in collective investment schemes had soared by 56% 
in 2003 after years of relatively stable growth. Although the source 
of these inflowing funds is unknown, there is speculation that it 
represents European capital moving out before the Directive is 
implemented. 
This capital market mobility is not just a theory; the London 
Eurobond market was initially formed in 1964 when the USA 
started levying tax on bond interest, and corporate borrowing (and 
the associated trading) was swiftly relocated to London. Market 
mobility is if anything even greater than it was in the 1960s, so the 
loss of the Eurobond markets if a withholding tax were levied 
would be very rapid. 
In the European Union tax measures can only be imposed by 
unanimous agreement of all Member State governments, which 
means that Luxembourg and the UK could, and did, veto any 
moves to introduce the savings directive. However after several 
years of strong pressure they extracted valuable concessions and 
finally gave way. One of the concessions was an exemption from 
the new rules for existing Eurobonds; this was essential as many of 
them included a clause for automatic redemption if withholding 
taxes were ever imposed, a factor that proves the importance of the 
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tax exemptions to market location. 
One of the strongest arguments used by the UK and 
Luxembourg was that the Savings Tax Directive would do only 
harm, not good; if all savings within the EU were taxed then 
investors would simply move their money outside. The EU would 
therefore lose valuable financial sector business and the related 
income, but without collecting any more tax. Bank deposits are 
clearly mobile, and although the Eurobond market seems more 
permanent it has moved once already (from New York) because of 
tax and would presumably be ready to move again. 
The agreement between the EU member governments 
therefore made the Savings Tax Directive conditional on its rules 
also being accepted by various non-EU countries, to ensure that 
there was no-where for these markets to move to. Specifically it 
must cover: 
The main non-EU European tax havens: 
Switzerland, Liechtenstein, San Marino, Monaco and Andorra; 
‘Dependent or associated territories’ of EU members: 
the Channel Islands, Isle of Man, the Dutch Antilles and 
Aruba, and the UK’s dependencies in the Caribbean. 
The EU has no formal jurisdiction over these countries, but 
they were clearly chosen because the EU felt that it could pressure 
them into agreeing to its demands, either due to geographic 
proximity or political or economic ties. The dependent territories 
eventually all agreed to participate, after pressure from the UK 
Treasury that even the UK’s Foreign & Commonwealth Office 
regarded as excessive. 
 
 
Implementation of the Savings Directive 
It was widely thought that the agreement to the Savings Tax 
Directive by the UK and Luxembourg, and its acceptance by the 
smaller low-tax jurisdictions, was an irrelevance because the 
process was conditional on Switzerland also agreeing. The Swiss 
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government was thought to be unlikely to ever agree to anything 
that might damage its international banking sector. 
However the Swiss were put under intolerable pressure, 
particularly by Germany (which was losing the most under the old 
system through its citizens investing in Luxembourg banks) 
introducing excessive customs checks and administrative 
inconveniences in an attempt to practically close the Swiss border 
(the Spanish have been using similar tactics against Gibraltar). 
Finally in June 2004 the Swiss government, after extracting 
other concessions from the European Union, agreed to sign up to 
the Directive, and in June 2005 the European Union members (in 
the Council of Ministers) accepted the 15 bi-lateral agreements and 
gave the ‘green light’ for the Directive to come into force, just in 
time for its due date of 1st July. 
Those new Member States from Eastern Europe, such as 
Estonia, who have celebrated their escape from communism by 
repositioning themselves as low-tax dynamic economies, may now 
find their renaissance damaged through having allowed the EU to 
reverse this policy by imposing Europe-wide taxes. 
In its current form the Directive is full of holes and should be 
easily avoidable; indeed the Swiss have dubbed it the “fools’ tax” 
because only those who do not take proper advice will be harmed 
by it. However this depends on how it is interpreted and 
implemented; since the primary duty of the European Court of 
Justice is to advance European integration (rather than to determine 
the meaning of new laws), there is a real danger that future 
disputes on the application of the Directive will see a widening of 
its scope, and a reduction in the opportunities for avoidance, by the 
Court. 
 
 
Does tax harmonisation matter? 
Of course one potential answer is that this does not matter; the 
EU has many powers, and imposing taxes is just one other. 
Historically tax does matter; “no taxation without 
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representation”, the need for democratic consent to a tax, is a 
common theme of revolt against autocratic governments, and it 
was a sound practical understanding of power that put control over 
taxes at the heart of democratic sovereignty. Now that taxes can be 
imposed at the EU level, against the will of future democratically 
elected national governments,16 then sovereignty has been 
transferred. This may be supported or opposed, but we should no 
longer pretend that it has not happened. 
The imposition of minimum taxes at the EU level also raises 
wider issues. The minimum tax rates are part of a move towards 
tax harmonisation, the equalisation (or approximation) of tax rates 
across the EU. The motive for this is to reduce tax competition, the 
ability of national governments to improve their economies by 
reducing their tax rates and so attracting business activity and 
investment. 
This tax competition has been a great benefit. The increase of 
the global market, especially the moves towards free capital 
markets following the ending of wartime exchange controls in the 
1980s, enabled investors to take advantage of lower tax rates 
around the world, and the fear of capital flight forced governments 
to reduce their punitive tax rates. This benefit has been 
acknowledged by the OECD: 
“The more open and competit ive environment of the last 
decades has had many positive effects on tax systems, including 
the reduction of tax rates and broadening of tax bases which have 
characterized tax reforms over the last 15 years. In part these 
developments can be seen as a result of competitive forces that 
have encouraged countries to make their tax systems more 
attractive to investors. In addition to lowering overall tax rates, a 
competitive environment can promote greater efficiency in 
government expenditure programs.”17 
                                                 
 
16 Albeit accepted by an earlier national government. 
17 “The OECD’s Project on Harmful Tax Practices: The 2001 Progress 
Report”, OECD, Paris (2001) paragraph 1. 
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Tax competition therefore acts as a restraint on individual 
governments’ ability to raise taxes; politicians still face demands 
from their electorates for improved public services, but if these 
cannot be met through increased taxation they are forced to make 
the public sector more efficient and better directed. Tax 
competition therefore increases public welfare, by reducing waste 
and inefficiencies and allowing public goods to be provided at a 
lower cost. Indeed international tax competition is essential 
because, unlike other sectors of the economy, there are few other 
effective constraints on government inefficiencies.18 
There are other knock-on benefits of tax competition; by 
acting as a restraint on governments’ ability to raise taxes, and so 
keeping taxes lower than they would otherwise be, tax competition 
promotes capital investment and encourages business activity. The 
effect of taxes on economic growth is difficult to quantify, but 
long-term comparative studies have suggested that each 1% of 
GDP taken in tax reduces growth rates by between 0.2% and 
0.4%.19 This may not sound like much, but that is an annual loss; 
over 25 years the cumulative effect of a tax reduction of just 3% of 
GDP would be a national economy around 30% larger than it 
would otherwise have been, with a resultant increase in 
employment and wages. 
 
 
Studies in tax harmonisation20 
Numerous academic studies have been made into the harm or 
                                                 
 
18 See Teather, R., “Multinational Tax Competition – a legal and 
economic perspective”, paper presented at the Tax Research Network 
conference, Cambridge University, September 2002. 
19 For a summary of recent studies, see "The negative impact of taxation 
on economic growth", Leach, Reform (London), September 2003. 
20 See Teather, R., “Harmful tax competition?”, Economic Affairs, 
London, Decemb er 2002. 
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otherwise of tax competition, many of them focused on federal 
structures, real or imaginary, and so appropriate to the EU 
situation. However, although most of these studies concluded that 
tax competition is harmful, they are generally coloured by their 
underlying assumptions and are challenged by more recent work. 
A few of the assumptions of these studies are so bizarre that, 
although often needed to simplify the mathematics enough to make 
the equations solvable, they risk invalidating the entire study. One 
for example assumes that the number of active entrepreneurs in the 
economy is a constant,21 despite the wide debate on the effect of 
taxation policies on the number of business start-ups. Many make 
the similar, often unstated, assumption that the amount of 
investment capital available is similarly invariable, despite the 
evidence that the availability of lower tax rates increases savings 
and therefore capital and the fact that one of the purposes of tax 
havens is to increase the available capital by allowing it to be 
pooled from a variety of countries without imposing an additional 
layer of tax.22 In the EU situation this assumption causes even 
more problems; although the EU may occasionally act as if there is 
no world outside its borders, it is in reality part of a global 
economy and therefore its tax policies can cause capital flight out 
to the rest of the world. 
Largely the studies result in the conclusion that tax 
competition is inefficient,23 distortionary, inequitable or generally 
welfare minimising,24 as it leads to reduced revenues for 
                                                 
 
21 Boadway, Cuff & Marceau, “Inter-Jurisdictional Competition for 
Firms: Jobs as vehicles for Redistribution”, University of Quebec, 1999. 
22 For evidence on this point see the UK parliament’s Treasury Select 
Committee’s Examination of Witnesses, Hansard, 2nd May 1999. 
23 See for example “Corporate Income Tax Competition, Double 
Taxation Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment”, Janeba, Journal of 
Public Economics, 1995. 
24 For a comprehensive over-view, see “Capital income taxation in 
Europe: trends and trade-offs”, Gorter & Mooij, Netherlands Bureau for 
Economic Policy Analysis. 
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governments and therefore reduced welfare spending. However 
this is based on the questionable assumption that government 
revenues automatically result in public welfare. This means that 
these studies all share a fundamental (sometimes even unspoken) 
assumption of the efficiency of government spending. Their 
authors believe that “levels of taxation and public goods provision 
within jurisdictions are settled by majority voting”,25 and taxation 
is transformed into the provision of public goods without loss or 
waste. 
Recently a few writers have challenged this assumption, 
concluding that the effect of tax competition on public welfare is 
“ambiguous”26 because a proportion of the benefits of taxation are 
lost through “waste and inefficiencies in the public sector”,27 but 
their work is generally dismissed due to lack of quantifiablity. 28 In 
contrast Public Choice theory, the analysis of government action 
by subjecting it to the same processes as we would the actions of 
private persons, opposes the view of taxation as necessarily 
beneficial29 and points out that governments are composed of and 
operated not by machines but by individuals, whose livelihoods 
and influence are generally dependent on the increase in 
government power and activity; governments are therefore run by 
people who have a vested interest in the increase of government. 
                                                 
 
25 “Tiebout with Politics: Capital Tax Competition and Constitutional 
Choices”, Perroni (University of Warwick) & Scharf (Institute for Fiscal 
Studies), 1996. 
26 “Capital Tax Competition with Inefficient Government Spending”, 
Eggert, Centre of Finance and Econometrics discussion paper, Konstanz 
University, 1999. Keen has also written in a similar vein. 
27 “Do We Need Tax Harmonisation in the EU?”, Boss, Kiel Institute of 
World Economics working papers, 1999. 
28 See Gorter & Mooij (above), pg 58. 
29 Buchanan is the main exponent of Public Choice theory; it is 
therefore unsurprising that he was one of the signatories of a letter to 
President Bush opposing the OECD tax harmonisation init iative. 
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In fact there is no causal link between increased taxation and 
increased public welfare.30 The inefficient conversion of 
government inputs (taxation) to outputs (valued public services) is 
caused not only by pure inefficiencies (such as over-manning and 
under-use of capital resources) but also by diversion (spending on 
outputs that are not sufficiently valued by the public). 
Modern governments tend to have their own bureaucratic 
growth that politicians can rarely tackle in more than a few isolated 
areas,31 and in a supranational system such as the EU this process 
is potentially even stronger, as the increased distance between the 
electorate and the government weakens the democratic controls 
and increases the opportunities for waste and self-enrichment.32 
Tax competition is therefore beneficial in checking the trend 
of bureaucracies to open-ended growth, and forcing efficiency 
savings. However a process that is beneficial to citizens it is not 
necessarily one that is attractive to governments. European 
politicians are currently feeling trapped by electorates who are 
unwilling to pay any more tax33 but want better public services for 
what they do pay, but faced with the choice of making their 
activities more efficient or increasing taxes, most governments 
would find it much easier to raise tax. Of course high taxes on 
savings income damages investment, reduces economic activity 
and jobs and ultimately makes the whole country poorer, but it is 
                                                 
 
30 Public welfare in this case must be defined as the value citizens 
receive from government activities, not the cost of such provision; a 
valuation of outputs rather than a summation of input costs. 
31 “It takes a very strong Secretary of State to resist recommendations 
from civil servants even though these are often quite narrowly founded”, 
Alan Clark (former UK government minister), quoted in his “Diaries”, 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London (1993) (see paperback edition, Phoenix 
(1994) p 74-75). 
32 See “The Theory of Public Choice: Federalism”, Tullock, 2000. 
33 In the UK for example, government advisers now believe that tax 
levels above 43% of GDP (only just above the current levels) will 
seriously damage their electoral prospects. 
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still a very tempting short-term target. 
 
 
Conclusions 
As a matter of law and constitutional principle, the EU has 
already taken tax raising powers, and can impose taxes against the 
will of a democratically elected national parliament through lasting 
minimum tax rates. 
These powers are not just theoretical, but have been exercised; 
EU—imposed taxes have long been the norm for VAT, and (since 
1st July 2005) they now also cover investment income. 
This is not just a constitutional or political argument, but a 
practical and economic one. Imposing taxes in the EU can cause 
capital flight to non-EU countries,34 reducing investment in 
Europe. 
Furthermore competition between countries for investment has 
kept taxes lower than they would otherwise have been; 
harmonisation or minimum tax levels across the EU would stifle 
this competition and allow governments more freedom to raise tax 
levels. This would tend to lower investment and damage the 
economy, with consequent damage to jobs and wages. 
Future generations, and the new EU entrants, could see 
themselves bound in to the higher tax rates needed to fund the 
welfare states and pension obligations of Old Europe; their 
prosperity would be better served by a more flexible approach. 
                                                 
 
34 Although the EU is hoping to minimise this effect by having forced 
other countries to sign up to its proposals, this is not an exhaustive 
process and there will still be many countries outside the scheme. 
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THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE OF 
POLITICS. ESSAY IN HONOUR OF 
ANTHONY DE JASAY 
Hardy Bouillon
*
 
 
It is a real delight to celebrate one of the greatest social 
philosophers of our time in this journal. In fact, I do not hesitate to 
confess that to me he is not one but the greatest social philosopher 
of our time. On a personal note, I would add that not only is he a 
man of admirable good manners, which these days one hardly finds 
accumulated in a single person; Anthony de Jasay is also a noble 
and gentle man of the old school who lives what he preaches. He 
likes himself and others to keep an agreement, and he dislikes 
himself and others to breach it.  
He is a most precise thinker, and a most precise reader. I 
remember one of his comments on a passage that contained a 
sloppy use of the word “naturally”. In fact, in the sentence in which 
I wrote it, it was nothing but unnecessary verbiage, even worse, it 
was misleading. All this he revealed without compromising me by 
simply writing in the margin “why ‘naturally’?” 
                                                 
* Hardy Bouillon is Head of Academic Affairs at the Centre for the 
New Europe, Brussels. E-mail address: hardy.bouillon@cne.org 
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It is the way he puts it, which in itself calls for admiration. 
This applies to his own and most original system of ideas as well 
as to his manifold crit icisms of competing intellectual frameworks. 
His criticism is always sharp, often amusing, but never invidious. 
Take, for instance, sentences like the following one. Alluding to 
constitutions, he wrote: “It should come as no surprise to students 
of human nature and the history of thought that some ideas are 
credited with a significance rather out of proportion with their 
intrinsic content.”1 And with respect to politics, he states: “The 
intrinsically dangerous, naked-razor nature of politics arises, not 
from politicians being cynical and bureaucrats incompetent, though 
it surely does not help if they are.”2 Finally, referring to Locke’s 
famous provisos of the original appropriation of land, namely ‘mix 
of labour’ with the land and leaving for late-comers ‘enough and as 
good’, he bluntly, but also elegantly, says: “The latter proviso can 
be dismissed as one that is impossible to fulfil except in fanciful 
conditions of abundance, where property rights are irrelevant in 
any case, so it does not matter how valid they are.”3 
Even the titles of his papers are telling. Take ‘Justice as 
something else’, ‘The cart before the horse’, ‘The rule of forces, 
the force of rules’, ‘The twistable is not testable’. The list could be 
much longer, and behind these titles, the most valuable criticisms 
on contributions to political philosophy by Brian Barry, John Gray, 
James Buchanan, and Karl Popper are to be found. 
His standing would not be the one it is, if in his writings the 
pars destruens were not matched by the pars construens. In other 
words, the criticism by Anthony de Jasay generates its strength 
from the ingenuity of his approach to social philosophy. His 
system of ideas is unique. He is a libertarian in a class of his own. 
                                                 
1 “The concept of rule-bound collective choice and the idea of 
constitutional safeguards”, in: Do Ideas Matter? Essays in Honour of 
Gerard Radnitzky, ed. by Hardy Bouillon, Brussels: CNE 2001, p. 55. 
2 See his Choice, Contract, Consent: A Restatement of Liberalism, 
London; IEA 1991. p. 114. 
3 See his Choice, Contract, Consent: A Restatement of Liberalism, 
London; IEA 1991. p. 72. 
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If it were not misleading, I would call his posit ion individualistic 
contractarianism. I doubt that he would be happy with this 
branding. His criticism of contractarianism, especially that of 
Buchanan, added a flavour to the term which remains true even in 
another intellectual ambience. Therefore, I fear that perhaps he 
would disdain the term individualistic contractarianism. Whether 
the political philosophy (potentially) resting on this principle 
should be called individualistic contractarianism or not is anyway 
another matter.4 
 
 
Rights stem from contracts 
Out of the many insights we owe to Anthony de Jasay, I shall 
stress the following one, because it leads straight to the main 
question of this short essay, namely: What is the constitutional 
value of politics?5  
Rights do not fall from the sky, they are not self-evident nor in 
any way logically deducible from natural or social facts of life. 
They may exist, but they provide no innate proof of the alleged 
unanimous consent of the parties involved. Jasay’s rights theory 
avoids this calamity. His position could be described by the slogan: 
Contracts breed rights, not the other way round.  
It is exactly this starting point that allows us to say what 
constitutes rights. To Jasay, “contract is their obvious, self-evident 
source, because only contracts provide proof that the correlative 
                                                 
4 I do not know if Anthony de Jasay uses any token for his position. 
Though in his Choice, Contract, Consent  he clearly speaks in favour of 
“strict liberalism”, I wonder whether he would label his position this way. 
Strict liberalism may be a perfect name for the preferred outcome of an 
intellectual enterprise such as his, but it seems less appropriate to describe 
comprehensively the intellectual approach that gives birth to it. 
5 Of course, it would be tempting to dwell on more, for instance the 
insight that public goods do not derive from a prisoner’s dilemma. 
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obligation has been agreed to by the obligor, hence its existence 
does not depend on controversial claims.”6  
Jasay does not exclude other potential sources of rights. 
“There is one clear case where the obligor can be placed under an 
unrequited obligation without unjustly harming his interests: when 
the obligation in question does not deprive him of any liberty, nor 
of any right, that he would otherwise have had. The obligation to 
respect the property of another acquired by ‘finders keepers’ would 
be of this kind; the wider obligation to respect the status quo can 
be derived along the same lines (…)”7 Nevertheless, he does not 
conclude that to respect the property of another acquired by 
‘finders keepers’ or any other unrequited obligation which does not 
unjustly harm a person’s interests is an obligation to which a 
corresponding right exists that is of the nature of a contractual 
right. 
Thus, we arrive at a generating dilemma. There are contractual 
rights and, per impossibile, non-contractual rights. Non-contractual 
rights consist of two classes, one which deprives the obligor of any 
liberty or any right, and one which does not. Hence, the latter is not 
a tertium quid amongst contractual and non-contractual rights, but 
a subsection of the latter. Even to representatives of this class 
Jasay’s observance applies, that they “have a status that is, to put it 
as soberly as one can, not comparable to the status of contractual 
obligations.”8 It is exactly this difference to which I will return 
later when answering the question of which value is constitutional 
to politics.9  
                                                 
6 See his Choice, Contract, Consent: A Restatement of Liberalism, 
London; IEA 1991. p. 91. 
7 See his Choice, Contract, Consent: A Restatement of Liberalism, 
London; IEA 1991. p. 92. 
8 See his Choice, Contract, Consent: A Restatement of Liberalism, 
London; IEA 1991. p. 93. 
9 One remarkable aspect of Jasay’s position is, however, that it includes 
a strong criticism of the widely spread natural rights approach in 
libertarianism. As I have tried to show elsewhere, it is the idea of natural 
rights that – besides apriorism, the argumentum e contrario and a logical 
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Freedom, rights, and liberties 
It goes without saying that rights deriving from contracts are 
only worth the paper on which they are written if the contracts are 
voluntarily agreed upon by all parties included. Forced contracts 
are based on non-contractual obligations and thus establish no 
rights. Obviously, freedom is a necessary cornerstone in Jasay’s 
thinking. If I am not mistaken, he does not explicitly define 
freedom10, though he stresses, of course, that freedom includes the 
absence of coercion in a person’s set of feasible acts. The point he 
is making about coercion is the following: 
“Coercion is an intentional act by A, whether actual or 
threatened, whose effect is to change B’s set of feasible 
alternatives as to make his chosen alternative different from what 
A presumed B’s preferred alternative to be. Successful coercion 
must make B act otherwise than A thought that he had intended to 
act. It achieves this by intrusion into B’s feasible set. Successful 
                                                                                         
circle in the definition of freedom – is hardest to accept in the 
libertarianism of Murray Rothbard and Hans-Hermann Hoppe et al; see 
my „Libertärer Anarchismus - eine kritische Würdigung“, in: Aufklärung 
und Kritik Sondernummer, 1998, pp. 28-40. By the way, the natural rights 
approach in Rothbard seems to me to be purely a functional one, as so 
many formulations imply. For example: “Since each individual must 
think, learn, value, and choose his or her ends and means in order to 
survive and flourish, the right to self-ownership gives man the right to 
perform these activities without being hampered and restricted by 
coercive molestations.” Murray Rothbard, For a New Liberty, the 
Libertarian Manifesto, New York 1973, p.9. 
10 I pondered on that question in a separate book, titled Freiheit, 
Liberalismus und Wohlfahrtsstaat, Baden-Baden: Nomos 1996, pp. 79-
128. As a result of that long pondering process, I ended up with a 
definition whose gradual evolution cannot be appropriately reconstructed 
here. For a short version see my „Defining libertarian liberty“, in: Hardy 
Bouillon (Hg.), Libertarians and Liberalism. Essays in Honour of Gerard 
Radnitzky, Avebury, pp. 95-103.  
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coercion alters the cost of alternatives so as to make B choose as A 
wishes, and not as A thought B wished.”11 
A point about this definition is that it does not lose its 
applicability if one replaces the term coercion either by trade or 
seduction. Be this as it may, I think the most important aspect of 
Jasay’s analysis of freedom is that man’s liberties are faculties 
“that we suppose to exist until proof is brought to the contrary.”12 
If I understand his reasoning correctly, he basically makes an 
epistemological argument. Unless there is proof to the contrary, a 
person is free to do what is feasible for him/her. Liberties do not 
need to prove their existence, but their denial does, because it is 
epistemologically and practically impossible to exclude the 
existence of any possible legitimate objection to the liberty in 
question, whereas it is relatively easy to request from the person 
denying to provide one case that supports his position. 13 
I think this argument is a valid one.14 However, saying that the 
burden of proof should be with the denier of a liberty does not 
prove the existence of freedom in any normative sense. Or to put it 
this way, saying that you do not have a right to intervene in my 
                                                 
11 See his Before Resorting to Politics, Cheltenham: Edgar Elgar 1996, 
p. 26. 
12 See his Choice, Contract, Consent: A Restatement of Liberalism, 
London; IEA 1991. p. 93. 
13 As Gerard Radnitzky has repeatedly pointed out, this is an analogous 
case to methodology. Scientific theories can never be proved to be true. 
Over a period of time they can only be corroborated by tests and 
corresponding test statements. The potential to be falsified one day 
remains. On the other hand, given that a falsifying test statement is less 
problematic than the theory it claims to falsify, then the theory in question 
is falsified. That is what (Popperian) methodology requests.  
In addition to that, Jasay also stresses the analogy to jurisdiction. The 
culprit is innocent until proven guilty. 
14 Nevertheless, I doubt that in the debate with loose liberals this is as 
strong as the argument in favour of contractual rights; whatever this 
objection may be worth. After all, the validity of an argument remains 
untouched by its potential as a useful weapon in an intellectual debate. 
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freedom unless you prove your title, does not imply that I have a 
right to be free in the way I have a right to do things as the 
consequence of an existing contract. In other words, an action 
taken (only) in freedom has a different status than an action taken 
in accordance with an existing contractual right. Of course, an 
action can be taken in freedom as well as in accordance with an 
existing contractual right. Moving into the house one has just 
bought or doing the job for which one gets paid. All these actions 
are free and just. 
In a way, freedom is similar to ‘finders keepers’. The freedom 
of A as well as the ‘finders keepers’ principle place the obligor B 
under an unrequited obligation without unjustly harming his 
interest. Unfortunately both, the case of freedom and the ‘finders 
keepers’ principle, cannot be made stronger. Freedom imposes 
obligations on others, and the status of these obligations is not 
comparable to the status of contractual obligations. The 
corresponding rights are likewise incomparable. Though it might 
be difficult in practical terms, universal individual contracting 
would be a way to give actions taken in freedom another status. 
 
 
Values, moral and political 
Broadly speaking, a value represents a lifestyle category 
expressing a certain disposition or preference which reveals itself 
in certain situations via the choice taken among feasible options. 
Saying so already presupposes that individuals can act, i.e. choose 
among feasible options. Saying that an individual can act, in turn, 
presupposes that he/she is free with respect to the feasible options 
in question. In other words, freedom is a prerequisite to any action, 
moral or other, and any moral value revealed by a moral action.  
Like all other values, a moral value reveals through the 
corresponding action(s) a certain outcome preference. Unlike most 
other values, a moral value expresses first and foremost a 
preference for the bettering or worsening of the status and/or the 
mores of the actor or any other person. That is to say, we do good 
primarily in order to better our lot or that of another person (or 
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other people) and/or to better our or their doing, and also we do 
bad in order to worsen our lot or that of another person (or other 
people) and/or to worsen our or their doing. It goes without saying 
that both, virtues and vices, express moral preferences. 
The actions expressing non-moral values, for example 
technical or aesthetical values, may also cause an improvement or 
deterioration in someone’s life, but their performance was not 
undertaken first and foremost for the bettering or worsening of the 
status and/or the mores of the actor or any other person. 
Traditionally, moral theory and political theory have always 
been linked, to say the least. Inspecting the history of political 
philosophy, one hardly finds any political theory of significance 
that does not seriously attempt to deliver an explicit or at least 
implicit theory of, and distinction between, moral and political 
values.15 Politics without morals is commonly treated as 
unthinkable by any serious political theory and nihilism is claimed 
to be the logical consequence of trying to think the unthinkable.16 
Usually, the task of political theory is embedded the explanation of 
either the origin or the function of a political body, and both origin 
and function are explained, although differently, with references to 
moral values of various kinds. Along these lines, Plato, initially, 
ended up with the explanation of the function of the polis by first 
                                                 
15 Although from time to time political values play significant roles in 
one or the other moral theory of a high number of authors, moral values 
play much more prominent roles in most political theories, especially 
modern ones. This fact, though not a very surprising one, is not self-
evident, and possible ways of explaining it would result in another paper. 
However, this imbalance should not be left unnoticed here. 
16 Thinkers who oddly tried to think the unthinkable were often 
misinterpreted and/or discredited. By the way, to call Nietzsche a nihilist 
is completely beside the point and ignores that he was the first to sense 
the two morals Hayek described later. Friedrich Nietzsche clearly saw 
that the preservation of the great or anonymous society, as Hayek called 
it, asked for moral values beyond those embedded phylogenetically as 
well as ontogenetically in human kind. These values of the hordes, in 
Nietzsche’s days more or less identical with Christian values, were to him 
insufficient to accommodate the new requirements of the great society. 
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of all looking for an answer to the question of what constitutes 
justice.17 Likewise, Aristotle reflected on the best constitution(s) of 
a political body in the light of the moral values on which they 
might rest.  
Nonetheless, temperance, fortitude, magnanimity, or their 
exaltations: none of them is constitutional to politic s. Of course, 
like any other action, for instance shaking hands, political action 
can be moderate, brave or generous, but it may also be without any 
of these values. Hand shakers and actors of a political body can be 
licentious or unreasonable, they can rashly fight or cowardly 
surrender, and they can be wasteful or avaricious. But what they do 
does not by necessity  rest on any of these adjectives and adverbs.18 
Again, in an admirable manner, Jasay gets to the heart of the 
matter when he says what politics is about: “Politics at its most 
basic is the generation and execution of collective choices. As such 
it is an instrument of extraordinary power. It has evident potential 
both for great good and unpardonable bad, with a broad array of 
the middling-good and middling-bad in between.”19 Though 
politics has the potential to be carried out in a way that can be 
characterized by one of the above mentioned values, it does not 
need to make use of them. 
                                                 
17 See the first book of Plato’s State. Although it is still debated whether 
or not the dialogue of Thrasymachos historically makes up the first book 
of the State, it is fairly evident that to Plato a moral value (justice) has an 
enormous impact on politics. 
18 Also, as we look to political values, we see on the tablet a rich variety 
of goals, some competing, some complementary, to which the political 
process should lead us. They range from conservative values like 
traditionalism, nationalism, strong defence, authoritarianism, to more 
liberal ones like social justice, egalitarianism, redistribution, 
environmentalism, and so forth. Though all of these may justly fit into the 
group of political values, none of them self-evidently reveals what is 
constitutional to politics, that is, what is the specific difference by which 
we distinguish political values from all other values. 
19 See his Choice, Contract, Consent: A Restatement of Liberalism, 
London; IEA 1991. p. 104. 
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In generating and executing collective choices, political actors 
take decisions by, for and with other people, and by doing so they 
reveal, like it or not, their outcome preference. But looking at their 
preferences is on another level than answering the question of what 
constitutes a political value. Nevertheless, by looking at collective 
choices, their execution and generation, one has a splendid starting 
point for coming to a conclusion, for all these choices necessarily 
reflect agreements (or if not shared, of course, disagreements). 
Thus, with the exception of totalitarian dictatorship,20 politics 
presupposes agreement and corresponding compliance. Hence, 
absurd as it may sound, politics cannot do without justice.21 In 
other words, justice is a value that is constitutional to politics.  
 
 
Conclusion 
Politics in a voluntarily ordered society is by definition based 
on voluntarily shared contracts. These contracts are voluntarily 
shared if for the time being all parties involved keep the contracts, 
hence behave justly. In this sense, justice, i.e. contract-keeping, is a 
value that is constitutional to politics. All other values might occur 
in politics, but are not constitutional for a societal order. It is 
thinkable, though not likely, that a society shares nothing but 
justice. Nevertheless, it might be worth mentioning that history 
seems to teach us that such societies do not have the bond to hold 
together in the long run. 
                                                 
20 Even totalitarian dictatorship requires in practice a minimum of 
mutual agreement between the dictator and his entourage. 
21 It seems to be an irony of life that politics, experienced by so many as 
full of injustice (taxation, redistribution, regulation etc.), per se has to be 
just in one aspect in order to exist at all. 
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